Effect of Consulting on Microcredit Repayment in Korea by 오윤해
KDI Journal of Economic Policy 2015, 37(3): 55?74 
55 
Effect of Consulting on 
Microcredit Repayment in Korea†
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This study examines the effect of a one-on-one outsourced pre-lending 
consulting service on the repayment behavior of microcredit 
borrowers in Korea with administrative data from the Smile 
Microcredit Bank. A random change in the cut-off loan amount for 
mandatory consulting is utilized as an identification strategy. This 
three-day pre-lending business consulting service is effective in 
encouraging repayment behavior of existing businesses but it has no 
significant effect on start-up loans. The effectiveness of the consulting 
service in deterring delinquency with regard to existing loans is 
greater among male borrowers than among females. 
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  I. Introduction 
?
ince Muhammad Yunus initiated the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1976, 
several developed countries have introduced microcredit businesses as well to 
ease financial exclusion in their countries. In Korea, microcredit programs were 
started around the year 2000 by small non-governmental organizations such as the 
Joyful Union and the Social Solidarity Bank. After the global financial crisis, around 
2010, the Korean government launched various political microcredit products,1
including the Smile Microcredit Bank (SMB). The SMB provides low-interest loans 
ranging from 2% to 4.5% to people with poor credit ratings2 (grades 7-10) or to
?
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those with low incomes.3
Although the SMB has grown through a government initiative, it is a non-profit 
organization whose source of funding consists of deposits in dormant accounts and 
donations. The SMB also provides business development services, as other typical 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) do. However, some critics argue that the 
government-led SMB is limited in terms of its business operations. The most 
salient critiques refer to its lackluster non-financial business development services.  
The non-financial business development services include business training, 
consulting and mentoring. These services are commonly regarded as key functions 
to support the self-help of borrowers. The SMB requires that some borrowers 
undergo outsourced three-day one-on-one business consulting. Since the late 2012, 
it has also operated one-day business training programs in limited regions: Seoul 
and Busan. Nevertheless, non-financial support by the SMB continues to lag 
behind that offered by its counterparts in other advanced countries or even in 
developing countries. Thus, the SMB must strengthen its business development 
services, but this would require them to incur considerable operating costs. 
Therefore, a careful study should be conducted to determine how to extend such 
services; should the bank offer the same services to a larger number of people or 
should it revise the lineup of its services that are currently available? 
As a first step, the current pre-lending consulting services need to be evaluated. 
To that end, this paper attempts to answer the following questions using 
administrative data from the SMB. First, could outsourced pre-lending business 
consulting increase the probability of repaying on time? Second, which borrowers 
benefit most from consulting? These questions could best be answered with a 
randomized controlled treatment akin to that in Karlan and Valdivia (2011). 
However, applying such a randomized controlled treatment in Korea and in other 
advanced economies is not practically feasible due to ethical issues. Therefore, this 
method cannot be applied to the current data on SMB borrowers.  
Fortunately, however, the SMB has changed the rules pertaining to consulting 
requirements. Once loan applicants meet the criteria, they must receive one-on-one 
consulting provided by an outsourced institution before they can take out loans. 
The SMB has changed the consulting requirement rules at random points in time. 
Thus, this paper takes an advantage of these random changes to assess the effect of 
pre-lending consulting on reducing instances of arrears.  
In fact, the ultimate long-term goal of MFIs would be to help clients increase 
their profit or income. Thus, the effects of consulting are best explained by 
analyzing profits, as in Mel et al. (2014) and McKernan (2002). Unfortunately, 
however, such an analysis is not possible because the SMB has no available 
information on the business performance or income of its clients. Given that the 
near-term primary objective of MFIs is to ensure timely repayments, the question 
as to whether or not a borrower will fall into arrears becomes a key concern for 
MFIs. Accordingly, it is important to verify whether pre-lending business 
consulting has any effects on preventing instances of arrears. Furthermore, 
microcredit users can repay their principle and interest on schedule only when they 
earn stable income. Therefore, arrears or the lack thereof can be a good indicator of 
?
3Potential welfare recipients, welfare recipients, and people eligible for the earned income tax credit (EITC). 
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the clients’ income status. In this sense, it is meaningful to analyze the effects of 
consulting on repayment behavior. Thus, this paper analyzes the effects of 
consulting, expanding the literature on business development services provided by 
MFIs (Mel et al. 2014; McKernan 2002; Halder 2003; Karlan and Valdivia 2011).  
Moreover, this research can identify the factors behind situations in which a 
debtor is in arrears as they arise with regard to microcredit in advanced countries, 
as these factors exhibit distinctly different characteristics from those of developing 
countries. Microcredit pursues two fundamentally incompatible goals. Thus, it is 
critical for microcredit institutions to devise an effective repayment management 
mechanism to ensure their sustainability while at the same time to explore ways to 
reach out to the financially disadvantaged. Group lending based on social ties and 
peer monitoring is common in developing countries with advanced microfinance 
systems. However, this technique is not applicable to urban clients in advanced 
economies, who tend to be individualistic. In light of such a difference, it is 
necessary to find an appropriate approach that could work in advanced countries. 
This paper aims to analyze whether non-financial services such as consulting can 
promote repayment behaviors in a relatively developed country, Korea. In this 
context, this research expands on previous investigations in this area (Bhatt and 
Tang 2002; Deininger and Liu 2009; Papias and Ganesan 2009) that discuss the 
determinants of repayment in microcredit.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of 
the related literature on microcredit in general. Section III briefly introduces the 
SMB and its consulting services. Section IV describes the empirical model and 
data. Section V?presents the estimation results. Section VI?presents the conclusions 
and policy recommendations. 
? ?
II. Literature Review 
?
There is a large body of literature which examines the various aspects of 
microcredit, including its poverty reduction effect (Khandker 2005; Nawaz 2010). 
Among these studies, this paper is related to those which examine the determinants 
of repayment of microcredit clients. Cull et al. (2007) noted that MFIs are likely to 
avoid lending to poor clients when they focus primarily on maximizing profits. 
This implies that it is difficult to attain the two goals of sustainability and  
outreach simultaneously. Consequently, in microcredit, it becomes very important 
to understand the determinants of repayment and to establish appropriate 
incentivizing repayment schemes for disadvantaged clients. 
A large theoretical body of work on principal/agent theory shows that joint-liable 
lending groups strengthen repayment behavior in microcredit (Stiglitz 1990; Besley 
and Coates 1995), as they facilitate peer monitoring and/or effectively utilize peer 
selection. Accordingly, the majority of studies on repayment focus on the group 
lending schemes (Bratton 1986; Zeller 1998; Wydick 1999). However, Sharma and 
Zeller (1997) find that group lending is particularly effective for low-income 
households residing in remote areas away from cities. In this respect, most of MFIs 
in advanced countries and the SMB in Korea do not utilize group lending schemes, 
where community-based mutual ties are weak.    
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Several studies have highlighted the effects of other factors on repayment. Field 
and Pande (2008) find that the repayment period, regardless of whether it is 
monthly or weekly, does not significant affect repayment. They also show that a 
monthly repayment schedule would be more cost-efficient. Khandker et al. (1995) 
find that the operational longevity of the branches in the area increases the default 
rate. They explain that this feature comes from the possible decrease in the 
marginal profitability of new projects. Zeller (1998) demonstrates that individual 
characteristics such as gender, youth, and the size of family do not affect 
repayment behavior.  
Although numerous studies have examined the determinants of repayment, the 
majority utilize data from developing countries, as microcredit originated and was 
developed mostly in those countries. As a result, little is known about microcredit 
in developed countries, although its characteristics could be much different from 
those in developing countries. With U.S. data, Bhatt and Tang (2002) find that 
instances of arrears decrease when the bank branch and the client’s business are 
located in the same area, and when clients are pressured and supervised with regard 
to their repayments. However, the sample size in Bhatt and Tang (2002) is quite 
small. The present paper utilizes an extensive administrative dataset from the SMB 
in Korea, which is the first empirical study of the SMB in Korea. Thus, this study 
may extend the scope of microcredit research beyond developing countries. 
This paper is also related to literature which examines the effects of non-
financial business development services. Most microfinance institutions offer 
business training and consulting services to increase their clients’ self-support 
capabilities. These non-financial services are considered to be crucial, as they 
determine the success of microfinance MFIs. Many empirical studies (e.g., Mel 
et al. 2014; McKernan 2002; Halder 2003) suggest that these services have positive 
effects on clients’ business performance or income. McKernan (2002) verifies that 
the increase in the business profits of clients is attributable to Grameen Bank’s 
training programs, which were designed to teach clients how to use certain types of 
machinery and to produce products. Halder (2003) discovers that in Bangladesh, 
women who participated in the BRAC training programs offered there earned 
higher incomes than those who did not. Mel et al. (2014) compare the effect of 
training only program with combination of business training and cash grants on 
female enterprises in Sri Lanka. They find that training only increases the 
profitability of start-ups, not existing firms. However, if cash grants are combined 
with a training service, the profits of existing firms also increase.  
Unlike the above-mentioned studies, this paper examines the effect of consulting 
on repayment behavior, rather than on business performance. Several studies also 
provide empirical results on this theme. Karlan and Valdivia (2011) with a 
randomized control experiment show that regular business education increases the 
possibility of on-schedule repayment and client retention. Khandker et al. (1995) 
also find that membership training has a positive influence on repayment. Godquin 
(2004) finds positive effects of basic literacy education and health services on 
repayments in Bangladesh MFIs. Godquin (2004) explains that the provision of 
non-financial services helps to develop relationships between MFIs and borrowers, 
which prevents strategic defaults and increases the ability to repay.  
Similarly, a pre-lending business consulting service may also have a positive 
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impact on repayment by SMB borrowers due to the strengthened profitability and 
greater level of closeness with the SMB. However, the frame of the SMB service 
differs from that of Godquin (2004) in that the service is not regularly provided and 
is executed by outsourced institutions. Moreover, the characteristics of borrowers 
in Korea may differ from those in developing countries. Thus, it should be 
empirically proven whether a pre-lending business consulting service has positive 
effects on repayment behavior in Korea.?
?
III. The Consulting Service of the Smile Microcredit Bank?
?
The SMB differs in terms of its structure and characteristics from traditional 
MFIs in developing or developed countries. The government led its creation and 
expansion, and a number of large corporate banks and private corporate groups are 
involved in its activities.4 In addition, the SMB arranges business consulting 
services which are provided by an external outsourced consulting institute. A brief 
explanation of the consulting program is provided below.  
?
A. Process and Costs  
?
The SMB requires clients whose loans reach a certain amount to enroll in a 
business consulting program as a condition of receiving a loan. The SMB 
outsources the consulting services to the Small Enterprise and Market Service 
(SEMAS),5 a quasi-government organization which operates under the Small and 
Medium Business Administration (SMBA). A client receives one-on-one 
consulting for three days, and consultant submits a report to the SMB about the 
feasibility of the client’s business. However, it is very rare for consultants to report 
a negative opinion of the feasibility on the business. 6 Thus, the pre-lending 
consulting service does not function as a screening process.    
The consulting program is paid for in part by a government subsidy (90%) and in 
part by clients (10%). The fee for clients was 50,000 won for the entire program 
until 2011, becoming 10,000 won per day in 2012. Previously, SEMAS used to 
assign consultants randomly to SMB clients, but currently clients can choose a 




Because they are one-on-one sessions, the details discussed during the 
consulting sessions can vary from client to client as well as from consultant to 
?
4Five banks (KB, IBK, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana) and six corporate groups (LG, SK, Lotte, Samsung, Posco, 
Hyundai Motor ) operate SMB branches within their donation fund. 
5SEMAS fosters small enterprises, traditional markets providing education, consulting, and marketing support. 
6There was only one case up until 2013 for which the consultant assessed the client’s business as not feasible. 
SEMAS consultants may have an incentive not to be harsh on SMB clients, as they are also evaluated by these 
clients, and their remuneration depends on the average evaluation scores. 
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consultant. Each session is divided into two groups based on whether the borrower 
is already running a business or is starting a new one.  
For a client who applies for a loan to cover the facility cost and operating 
expenses of an existing business, consulting sessions focus on presenting a 
comprehensive diagnostic review of the business. Consultants attempt to find 
solutions to current and potential problems so as to ensure the success of the 
business, including an analysis of the business environment, finances, accounting 
practices, marketing, store management, and customer management.  
On the other hand, consulting programs for clients who start new businesses 
include a feasibility analysis, a location analysis, an examination of matters related 
to the opening of the store, business administration, customer management, and 
other matters of which the client should be aware before launching the business.  
?
C. Rules on Consulting Requirements  
?
As shown in Table 1, the loan threshold at which pre-lending consulting 
becomes mandatory has varied from time to time. For operating expense loans, 
since October of 2010, clients whose loan amounts were 10 million won or more 
have been required to enroll in the consulting program. However, from May to 
September of 2010, clients with loans worth 5 million won or more were requested 
to join the program. The changes to the criteria have been random and can 
therefore be useful if used to examine a possible link between pre-lending 
consulting and the probability of a business being in arrears.  
For start-up loans, nearly all clients applying for loans had to complete the 
consulting program regardless of the loan amount. However, between September of 
2010 and December of 2011, the consulting requirement applied only to those who 
borrowed 10 million won or more. Furthermore, start-up business consulting was 
replaced by the submittal of a business plan during a certain period of time. These 
inconsistent and random changes can be useful for determining whether the 
consulting service has a significant impact on preventing or reducing instances of 
arrears. 
?
TABLE 1— CHANGES IN THE CONSULTING REQUIREMENT CRITERIA 
Loan Type Operating Loan  Loans for Start-ups 











January 1. 2010 ~ May 16. 2010 X X Required Required Required Required
May 17. 2010 ~ September 27. 2010 X Required Required Required Required Required
September 28. 2010 ~ December 14. 2011 X X Required X X Required
December 15. 2011 ~ May 7. 2012 X X Required Substitutable Substitutable Substitutable 
May 8. 2012 ~ December 31. 2012 X X Required Required Required Required
January 1. 2013 ~ April 22. 2013 X X Required Substitutable Substitutable Substitutable 
April 23. 2013 ~ June 30. 2013 X X Required Required Required Required
Notes: Substitutable indicates that writing up a business plan can be done in lieu of consulting. 
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D. How a Consulting Service Affects the Repayment Behavior 
?
There are three possible mechanisms by which pre-lending consulting may be 
correlated with the repayment behavior of clients. First, business consulting can 
have a positive impact on business performance. As a result, the profits of clients 
who receive consulting are greater than those of clients who do not. If consulting 
brings positive changes in the attitudes and the styles of doing business, the client’s 
profits may increase. With the increased profits, the client would likely display 
better repayment behavior than clients who did not participate in the consulting 
program.  
Second, pre-lending consulting can build a sense of solidarity which leads to a 
stronger sense of responsibility concerning repayment. In other words, even if a 
client’s business performance remains the same, the client may form a sense of 
attachment to the SMB loan officer during the course of the consulting program, 
and this attachment may motivate the client to avoid falling behind on repayments. 
As Godquin (2004) explains, non-financial services may increase the value of the 
relationship with the MFI and increase the opportunity cost of a strategic default. 
Although the consulting program is operated by outsourced institutions related the 
SMB, the consulting program can still build responsibility in clients. Clients may 
not distinguish the consultant from an SMB employee, and the SMB loan officer 
may communicate with clients at a deeper level after receiving detailed information 
from the consultant.  
Third, pre-lending consulting may serve as a screening process through which 
unqualified clients are weeded out. Indeed, it is desirable for this type of screening 
mechanism to work. Such a filtering process can benefit both existing and new 
businesses. If an existing business is not profitable and is uncompetitive, closing it 
down rather than incurring additional loans could be a better choice for the owner. 
In contrast, if the chance of failure is high for a client who plans to start a new 
business, it is better to let the client take the time to ensure that everything is ready 
instead of hurrying and prematurely opening the business. In these situations, the 
consulting program can help clients make better choices by giving them sufficient 
time to stop and reconsider their options. However, if such a screening mechanism 
does exist, this means that there is a selection rule that may have affected the 
sample.  
However, as mentioned earlier, it is very rare for SEMAS consultants to report 
that clients are ineligible for a loan, and such a screening mechanism is practically 
non-existent in our sample. Therefore, this research will focus on the first two 
possible mechanisms: how consulting can improve the client’s business 
performance and how it may build a sense of solidarity. 
?
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?
IV. Empirical Specification and Data?
?
A. Empirical Specification 
?
The previous section discussed the characteristics of business consulting with 
regard to loans from the SMB. In the following basic model, we use logistic 
regression to estimate the effect of consulting on the probability of repayment 
behavior: 
i i i i iRepayment ? ?Consulting X ? Z ? ?? ? ? ? ?                     (1) 
Here, the dependent variable Repaymenti is a dummy variable which has a value 
of one when borrower i has made regular repayments on time (no arrears), taking a 
value of zero otherwise. Consultingi is the key regressor of interest, indicating that 
the borrower was required to enroll in one-on-one consulting, which is determined 
by the loan origination timing and the amount of the loan. If one-on-one business 
consulting has a positive effect on repayment behavior, the coefficient Consultingi 
would have a positive value. 
Xi is a matrix of control variables. It includes the characteristics of the loans, in 
this case the amount of the loan and the length of the grace period. During a certain 
period, the requirement of mandatory consulting for start-up loan applicants could 
be satisfied instead by the writing of a business plan. Thus, a variable for this type 
of substitution is also included in the model for start-up loans. 
Xi also includes individual characteristics of borrower i, in this case the credit 
score, a dummy variable for male, and the age of the borrower. Credit scores in 
Korea have a value between one and ten, where the credit score increases when the 
credit rating worsens. Therefore, a value of ten represents the worst credit rating, 
and the coefficient of the credit rating is expected to be negative. Sometimes, 
borrowers do not have a credit rating due to the lack of enough credit history. In 
this case, we assign a value of eleven, which is inferior to other borrowers with 
credit ratings, and we add a dummy variable to signify no credit rating. Xi also 
includes variables pertaining to financial status, such as the log of the average 
monthly income, the log of the existing total debt at the point of loan application, 
and the log of the total value of all assets of the borrower.  
Additionally, different loan origination times should be controlled, as there 
would be a tendency of more instances of arrears for older loans with a larger 
number of payments due. Therefore, a set of control variables, denoted as Zi,
includes the remaining months to maturity and the number of expected payments 
due. As the effect of different loan origination times could be non-linear, the 
number of expected payments due is included both as a continuous variable and as 
several discrete dummy variables. 
Moreover, the effects of consulting on repayment may not be the same for all 
borrowers. For example, the effect of consulting could be greater with borrowers 
who have more business experience. Thus, we extend the basic regression model 
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with the interaction term Consultingi ??Wi ?to capture the effects of consulting on 
repayment according to the various types of borrowers. 
   
)(i i i i i iWRepayment ? Consulting ? X ? Z ? ??? ? ? ? ?                 (2) 
We formulate several variations of Wi, which is a set of categorical variables. 
These are gender groups, age groups, and the types of regions based on the 
business site. For the region, we divide them into three groups: big cities, small 
cities, and rural areas. Big cities include Seoul and six large metropolitan cities. 
Rural areas are identified with the administrative township “Eup” or “Myeon,” 
indicating a countryside area.?
?
  B. Data?
?
The data for the analysis consists of confidential administrative data from the 
SMB. The raw data consists of all loans originated from January of 2010, when the 
SMB started to offer microcredit through its branches; 7  it includes client 
information from loan application documents, such as the gender and credit ratings 
of the borrowers and the details of their loans. Information about repayment 
behavior is constructed by comparing the number of actual payments and that of 
expected payments that must be made until the time of the observation,8 December 
of 2012. 
Mandatory consulting is only required for clients using standardized products 
that are commonly offered in all branches; thus, several special products which are 
offered certain specialized branches are excluded. Among the standardized 
products,9 the two most common products are analyzed in this paper, i.e., start-up 
loans for rent deposits by new businesses and business operating loans for existing 
businesses.  
To construct the sample for the regression, we use loans which were approved 
from April of 2010 to January of 2012 in order to exclude loans provided 
immediately after the SMB was launched. This subset is suitable for the analysis 
because the criteria for the consulting requirement changed for both business 
operating loans and start-up loans during this period. As a robustness check, we 
also conducted the same regression with loans that were originated in different 
periods.
We also exclude loans that are either too small or too large, as the cut-off point 
for mandatory consulting was established based on the loan amount. In the panel of 
start-up loans for new businesses, we use the subset of loans between 7 million and 
16 million won, as the cut-off point was 10 million won in a certain period. On the 
other hand, for business operating loans, we use the subset of loans between 
?
7The data only contains the clients of the SMB branches, excluding on-lending clients of the traditional market 
and other microcredit institutions. 
8The raw data does not include information about how long the loan is overdue or when arrears occurred. 
9Standardized products include loans for franchises, loans for education, and loans for facilities, but business 
operating loans and start-up loans are most common.  
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Loan Type Business Operating Loans  (Obs.= 3691) 
Start-up Loans 
 (Obs.= 562) 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Repayment (Dummy) 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Consulting (Dummy) 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Loan Amount (Million) 8.54 1.88 3.5 10 11.28 2.36 8 15 
Grace Period (Month) 0.43 1.46 0 6 2.04 2.26 0 12 
Credit Rating (1~11) 7.69 0.86 2 11 7.62 0.88 4 11 
No Credit Rating (Dummy) 0.004 0.06 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Male (Dummy) 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Age 44.72 9.68 20 78 40.45 9.39 20 77 
Income (Million) 2.41 0.88 0 7.80 2.13 1.24 0 7.50 
Total Assets (Million) 31.61 29.36 0 208.50 25.51 22.37 0 130 
Existing Debt (Million) 8.98 10.13 0 260 5.80 7.98 0 40.37 
? ?
3 million and 12 million won, as the cut-off point was 5 million or 10 million won. 
Robustness tests are also performed by modifying the range of the loan amount. 
Outliers are removed from the sample, such as loans to the clients who had more 
than 8 million won in monthly income, more than 350 million won in assets, or 
more than 300 million won in debt. Some clients were allowed to roll over their 
existing loan by taking out a new loan10, and some clients took out loans multiple 
times. Both such cases are also eliminated.  
Summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in 
Table 2. 
?
V. Results and Discussion?
? ?
A. Business Operating Loans for Existing Businesses?
?
In this section, we present and interpret the results of the estimation of the 
impact of participation in pre-lending business consulting on repayment 
performance. The results of the main regression with business operating loans are 
presented in Table 3.  
Table 3 displays the regression results of four specifications. The first two 
columns provide the marginal effect and the estimates of the base model. In 
specification (2), we control for the debt-to-income ratio and the debt-to-assets 
ratio instead of the log of assets, the log of monthly income and the log of debt. In 
specification (3), we control for possible non-linear effects with regard to the 
number of expected payments with several dummy variables instead of a 
continuous variable. In specification (4) we use dummy variables for the age 
groups instead of a continuous age variable to control for a possible non-linear 
effect of age. All results reported are estimated with the logistic regression model. 
The results for all specifications show a positive and significant effect of pre- 
lending business consulting on the repayment behavior of existing entrepreneurs  
?
10Roll-over loans are occasionally made to manage repayments, refreshing loans in arrears for a longer period. 
However, these loans are excluded, as information about the older loans is not available. 
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TABLE 3— MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS: OPERATING LOANS
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Marginal Effect   Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Consulting (Dummy) 0.051** 0.259** 0.263** 0.302*** 0.260** 
(0.021) (0.106) (0.105) (0.108) (0.106) 
Loan Amount (Million) -0.012** -0.060** -0.057** -0.079*** -0.062** 
(0.005) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Grace Period (Month) -0.014** -0.069** -0.064** -0.113*** -0.067** 
(0.006) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) 
Credit Rating (1~11) -0.050*** -0.254*** -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.256*** 
(0.009) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
No Credit Rating (Dummy) 0.299 1.506* 1.512* 1.504* 1.550* 
(0.158) (0.796) (0.790) (0.799) (0.795) 
Male (Dummy) -0.015 -0.077 -0.082 -0.066 -0.066 
(0.015) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) 
Age 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log Income (Million) -0.005 -0.023 -0.022 -0.024 
(0.006) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Log Assets (Million) 0.004** 0.021** 0.019** 0.021** 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log Existing Debt (Million) -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Months left to Maturity 0.006** 0.033** 0.031** 0.051*** 0.032** 
(0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
No. of Expected Payments -0.011*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.056*** 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Debt / Asset -0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt / Income 0.000* 
(0.000) 
Constant 4.153*** 4.197*** 3.482*** 4.278*** 
(0.528) (0.526) (0.518) (0.514) 
Dummies of Expected payments x x o x 
Dummies of Age Groups  x x x o 
Observations 3,691 3,691 3,691 3,691 
LogLikelihood -2128 -2128 -2116 -2125 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; the dependent variable is repayment. Region-fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level.
?
who took out operating loans. According to the marginal effect in the first column, 
for the average borrower, the probability of repayment without arrears increases by 
5% when the borrower enrolls in the consulting service. Thus, enrolling in one-on-
one business consulting has an impact similar to an increase of one grade of the 
credit score on the repayment performance of a typical existing entrepreneur.      
This result implies that non-financial services in Korea may enhance the 
financial performance levels of MFIs through improved repayment behavior, as in 
developing countries. As the repayment behavior of micro-entrepreneurs is strongly 
related to the cash flow of the business, it is highly likely that the regression result 
is caused by the positive impact of the business consulting on the profits of micro-
entrepreneurs. If an existing entrepreneur could gain useful ideas or advice from an 
expert from an objective perspective, the business performance of the borrower 
will likely improve. Utilizing the microcredit data of developing countries, Mel  
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et al. (2014), Halder (2003), and McKernan (2002) also find that non-financial 
services have a positive impact on the profits of borrowers. However, to clarify this 
mechanism more directly, an additional analysis with business performance data 
should be conducted, though this is not available at this point. 
On the other hand, the positive impact of one-on-one business consulting can 
also be explained by the strengthened responsibility of borrowers after in-depth 
communication prior to receiving a loan. Karlan and Valdivia (2011) find that 
regular entrepreneurship training has a positive impact on repayment performance 
and client retention, whereas such a service has little impact on key business 
outcomes such as revenue or profit levels. Godquin (2004) also finds a positive 
impact of non-financial services on repayment performance which is not directly 
related to the performance of the business, such as basic literacy education and 
access to health services. In the SMB, although consulting is neither regularly nor 
directly executed by the staff, the experience of sincere communication prior to 
lending may have strengthened the loyalty of borrowers to the SMB.  
In both cases, it is certain that business consulting has a positive impact on the 
financial stability of the SMB through improved repayment performance. Currently, 
the recipients of pre-lending consulting for business operating loan are very limited. 
The consulting requirement applies only to basic products, and loans of less than 
10 million won are excluded, even in basic products. Therefore, the SMB must 
expand its one-on-one consulting service to cover more existing micro-
entrepreneurs. This will support the business performance of clients and the 
repayment management efforts of the SMB.  
The coefficients of other variables in Table 3 are reasonable. Credit rating has a 
negative and significant impact on repayment performance, as a higher credit score 
signifies an inferior credit rating in Korea. The length of the grace period has a 
negative and significant coefficient, implying that originating loans without a grace 
period is a better management strategy for repayment by existing entrepreneurs. 
Income and existing debt have an insignificant impact, as these factors are already 
controlled through the credit rating variables. 
Table 4 presents the results of the robustness checks, including estimates with 
pseudo-consulting indicators and estimates with a different subset. Generally, 
borrowers with the better credit ratings are eligible for larger loan amounts. This 
can also be applied to the SMB, although the SMB focuses more on borrowers’ 
needs as compared to other typical financial institutions. Thus, we control the size 
of the loan and the credit rating, and we utilize the period when the cut-off point 
was randomly changed. However, there remains the possibility that the positive 
impact of consulting on repayment is a spurious relationship stemming from the 
fact that borrowers with larger loans tend to be more able to repay them.  
To check the robustness further, we create several pseudo-consulting variables. 
In specification (1) of Table 4, the pseudo-consulting variable represents loans that 
are greater than 8 million won, and the estimate is insignificant. In specification (2), 
we use a different pseudo-consulting variable which counterfactually differentiates 
the period when the cut-off point was changed; this coefficient is also insignificant. 
Thus, a simple division into large and small amounts cannot determine the source 
of the impact of consulting on repayment.  
In addition, although consulting was mandatory according to the SMB regardless 
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TABLE 4— ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: OPERATING LOANS





Consulting (Dummy) 0.225** 0.451** 0.261** 0.230** 
(0.109) (0.177) (0.106) (0.100) 
Loan Amount (Million) -0.050 -0.022 -0.054** -0.103** -0.064** -0.038 
(0.048) (0.020) (0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.024) 
Grace Period (Month) -0.061** -0.062* -0.073** -0.142*** -0.060* -0.055* 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.029) 
Credit Rating (1~11) -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.242*** -0.276*** -0.249*** -0.276*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.065) (0.046) (0.044) 
No Credit Rating (Dummy) 1.513* 1.517* 1.480* 1.779 1.476* 2.691** 
(0.797) (0.797) (0.796) (1.133) (0.796) (1.059) 
Male (Dummy) -0.084 -0.083 -0.086 -0.137 -0.068 -0.001 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.112) (0.076) (0.071) 
Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.010* 0.006 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log Income (Million) -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 -0.005 -0.019 -0.015 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.041) (0.031) (0.028) 
Log Assets (Million) 0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.022* 0.021** 0.015* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
Log Existing Debt (Million) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Months left to Maturity 0.037** 0.036** 0.033** 0.052*** 0.032** -0.047*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.008) 
No. of Expected Payments -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.140*** -0.057*** 0.023 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.014) 
Constant 3.940*** 3.788*** 3.961*** 6.187*** 4.174*** 3.548*** 
(0.564) (0.508) (0.533) (1.051) (0.537) (0.497) 
Observations 3,691 3,691 3,576 1,549 3,652 3,691 
Log Likelihood -2131 -2131 -2061 -946.5 -2105 -2305 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, estimates from the logit regression are represented, and the 
dependent variable is repayment. Region-fixed effects are included in all specifications.   
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level.
?
of the willingness of the borrower, it is necessary to account for the possibility that 
borrowers intentionally evade consulting by taking out loans which fall just under 
the threshold. In specification (3), we construct a new subset in which observations 
of loan amounts which are slightly under this threshold, when the initial desired 
amount of the borrower exceeded it, are removed.11 Even with this subset, main 
findings do not change. 
We also conduct additional robustness tests. In specification (4), we shorten the 
loan origination period to February of 2011. In specification (5), we change the 
range of the loan amount of samples, making it between 4 million and 15 million 
won. In specification (6), we use repayment information as observed six month 
later, in June of 2013 instead of December of 2012. The results are still positive 
?
11When the cut-off amount is 10 million won, we exclude borrowers who take out loans which are between 
9.6 million and 10 million won when the originally desired amount was more than 10 million won on the loan 
application document. Similarly, with the cut-off amount of 5 million won, loans of between 4.6 million and 5 
million won are excluded when the initial desired amount was more than 5 million won.   
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and significant for all specifications, as in the main regression.12
?
B. The Effect of Consulting according to the Types of  
Borrowers of Business Operating Loans 
 
The above-mentioned positive impact of consulting on repayment performance 
among existing micro-entrepreneurs can vary according to the type of borrower. 
Thus, we conduct a regression of Equation (2), taking into account interaction 
terms of consulting variables and each type of borrower. These include gender, age 
group, and region. Table 5 presents the estimates of the interaction terms. 
The first and second columns show that the effect of consulting on repayment 
performance is greater for male borrowers than for female borrowers. We may 
interpret this result in light of two possible situations. Firstly, as most consultants 
are males at the institutions providing the consultations,13 female borrowers may 
?
TABLE 5— INTERACTION TERMS: OPERATING LOANS
Category ?  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Gender Consulting x Male 0.324** 0.298**
(0.129) (0.127) 




Consulting x 20s -0.071 -0.097 
(0.270) (0.268) 
Consulting x 30s 0.130 0.108 
(0.150) (0.148) 
Consulting x 40s 0.358*** 0.329**
(0.133) (0.131) 
Consulting x 50s 0.471*** 0.435***
(0.166) (0.164) 




Consulting x Big City  0.396*** 0.257** 
(0.129) (0.117) 
Consulting x Small City 0.058 0.168 
(0.145) (0.135) 
Consulting x Rural Areas 0.236 0.292 
?  (0.213) (0.207) 
Observations 3,691 3,691 3,691 3,691 3,691 3,691 
?  Log Likelihood -2130 -2142 -2126 -2137 -2128 -2142 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; estimates from the logit regression are represented. The 
dependent variable is repayment. In all specifications, loan amount, grace period, credit rating, no credit score, 
gender, age, No. of expected payment, months to the maturity, and constant are included; In specification (1), (3), 
and (5), log of monthly income, log of assets, log of debt and region fixed effects are added.   
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
?
12For additional robustness checks, we used several dummy variables for credit ratings instead of a continuous 
variable to control for a non-linear effect. We also included an interaction term for consulting and the period when 
cut-off point was changed to control for a possible mean effect of the period itself. The regression results were still 
consistent.
13In 2014, the number of male consultants was 1,012 while the number of female consultants was 206. 
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not form a sense of solidarity with male consultants in the manner that male 
borrowers do. Secondly, in Korea, it is common for small businesses to be run by 
entire families. Thus, a female borrower may have a husband who practically 
manages the business. In this case, an effective change will not come about after 
only the female borrower enrolls in the business consulting. Therefore, to provide 
more effective business consulting, it is suggested to let the all of the business 
partners to undertake consulting together.  
The third and fourth columns indicate that the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms are significant and positive only for borrowers in their 40s and 
50s. This result suggests that business consulting is effective for experienced 
borrowers in their 40s and 50s. As most people hold college degrees in Korea, 
borrowers under 30 may not have enough experience. On the other hand, borrowers 
in their 60s have had sufficient time, especially if they start their businesses soon 
after retirement, which is very common in Korea. Therefore, to promote the 
effectiveness of consulting on inexperienced borrowers, it is necessary to 
supplement their insufficient business experience with business training and 
education as well as one-on-one consulting. Clients who lack experience may find 
a training program tailored to meet their needs extremely helpful when offered in 
conjunction with a consulting program. 
The fifth and sixth columns show the estimated interaction terms of the 
consulting indicator and the regions of the business sites. These results show a 
significant and positive effect only for large cities such as Seoul and the six 
metropolitan cities. This result may show that the quality of the consultants and the 
content of the consultations in small cities and in remote rural areas are not as good 
as they are in large cities. Hence, it is necessary to strengthen the quality of 
consulting in areas other than large cities. 
?
C. Start-up Loans for New Business?
? ?
The results of the main regression for the group of start-up loans are shown in 
Table 6. In all specification, borrowers with no credit rating are eliminated in the 
sample as all of them made full repayment. We present five different specifications, 
including the base model in the first column. In specification (2), we control for the 
debt-to-income ratio and the debt-to-assets ratio. In specification (3), we use 
several dummy variables for the number of expected payments instead of a 
continuous variable. In specification (4) we use dummy variables for the age 
groups instead of a continuous age variable. In specification (5), we include the 
index of substitution, i.e., writing up a business plan instead of enrolling in 
consulting. In all five specifications, the consulting variable in start-up loans shows 
a statistically insignificant coefficient, indicating that repayments by new start-ups 
do not improve with one-on-one pre-lending consultations.  
One reason for the insignificance effect of pre-lending consulting could be 
incomprehension by inexperienced start-ups. Experienced borrowers who receive 
operating loans for existing firms tend to repay better if they enroll in pre-lending 
consulting, as in the above results. In contrast, inexperienced borrowers who start 
new businesses may not be affected by this type of consulting, as they do not fully 
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TABLE 6— MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS: START-UP LOANS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Consulting (Dummy) 0.004 0.020 0.145 -0.021 0.010 
(0.289) (0.290) (0.318) (0.289) (0.317) 
Substitution (Dummy) 0.025 
(0.517) 
Loan Amount (Million) -0.078* -0.084* -0.100** -0.076 -0.079* 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) 
Grace Period (Month) -0.066 -0.066 -0.061 -0.062 -0.066 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.056) 
Credit Rating (1~10) -0.395*** -0.396*** -0.408*** -0.399*** -0.395*** 
(0.124) (0.123) (0.131) (0.124) (0.124) 
Male (Dummy) -0.425** -0.420** -0.414* -0.393* -0.425** 
(0.205) (0.205) (0.211) (0.205) (0.205) 
Age -0.022** -0.023** -0.025** -0.022** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Log Income (Million) -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Log Assets (Million) 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.007 
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Log Existing Debt (Million) 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Months left to Maturity 0.053 0.055* 0.060* 0.050 0.053 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) 
No. of Expected Payments 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.023 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Debt / Asset 0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt / Income 0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant 4.646*** 4.655*** 5.716*** 3.976*** 4.638*** 
(1.313) (1.312) (1.439) (1.249) (1.322) 
Dummies of Expected payment x x o x x 
Dummies of Age Groups  x x x o x 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 
Log Likelihood -304.7 -303.8 -293.2 -306.1 -304.7 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and the dependent variable is repayment. Estimates from the logit 
regression are represented. The borrowers with no credit rating are eliminated in the sample as all of them made 
full repayment. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
?
understand what the consultants suggest. Mel et al. (2014), studying female 
enterprises in Sri Lanka, find that business training for female enterprises can 
effectively increase profits, even for new owners. The business training in Mel et al.
(2014) was very intensive compared to the three-day consulting service of the SMB. 
The business training service consists of a three-day course on developing business 
ideas, a five-day course on starting a business,14 and one day of technical training 
which varies according to the type of business. Thus, to complement the consulting 
service for inexperienced start-ups, business training or education sessions may be 
beneficial.    
Moreover, the SMB provides a one-shot service in the initial stage, while the 
non-financial service in Karlan and Valdivia (2011) continued regularly for one  
?
14This covers main aspects of starting a business, including pricing, organization, equipment, other inputs, and 
financial planning.  
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or two years. Regular service is not only more advantageous to establish 
responsibility in clients but also effective at enhancing business performance. As 
borrowers of start-up loans do not have enough experience or knowledge about 
their business, they may not sufficiently understand what the consultant suggests or 
explains. The borrower may also have difficulty when encountering unexpected 
situations despite any confidence during the initial steps. Thus, to make the 
business consulting for effective for start-ups, regular check-ups may be required 
rather than a one-shot pre-lending service.  
In all specifications, most variables did not show a significant coefficient, except 
for credit rating and gender. The coefficient of credit rating is significant and 
negative, as expected, showing that repayment behavior is degraded as the credit 
rating becomes poorer (i.e., as the credit score increases). The dummy for male 
borrower shows a significant and negative coefficient, and this is consistent to 
earlier findings in the literature which show that female borrowers have display 
repayment behavior (Kevane and Wydick 2001, Khandker et al. 1995; Pitt and 
Khandker 1998; Sharma and Zeller 1997). 
Table 7 shows the results of the robustness test. The first concern was selection 
error, e.g., when borrowers intentionally avoid consulting by taking out a smaller 
loan when they originally wanted a larger loan. Thus we remove observations of 
? ?
TABLE 7— ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: START-UP LOANS
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Consulting (Dummy) -0.184 -0.033 -0.097 0.200 0.138 
(0.310) (0.286) (0.621) (0.341) (0.274) 
Loan Amount (Million) -0.081* -0.080* -0.065 -0.222 -0.069 
(0.047) (0.046) (0.079) (0.168) (0.045) 
Grace period (Month) -0.060 -0.065 -0.110 -0.111* -0.091* 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.082) (0.067) (0.053) 
Credit rating (1~11) -0.272** -0.241** -0.437*** -0.222* -0.003 
(0.116) (0.112) (0.160) (0.128) (0.110) 
Male (Dummy) -0.477** -0.414** -0.829*** -0.474* -0.448** 
(0.210) (0.203) (0.315) (0.246) (0.196) 
Age -0.018 -0.019* -0.014 -0.010 -0.026** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) 
Log Income (Million) -0.060 -0.013 -0.156 0.006 -0.027 
(0.087) (0.017) (0.142) (0.107) (0.081) 
Log Assets (Million) 0.032* 0.005 0.034 0.010 0.025 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) 
Log Existing Debt (Million) -0.007 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.005 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) 
Months left to maturity 0.045 0.044 0.083* 0.112** 0.033 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.048) (0.044) (0.031) 
No. of Expected payments 0.016 0.020 -0.007 0.006 0.009 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.054) (0.028) (0.021) 
Constant 3.972*** 3.472*** 7.508*** 4.181* 1.648 
(1.303) (1.235) (2.133) (2.148) (1.238) 
?????
Observations 529 562 248 413 558 
Log Likelihood -289.3 -310.0 -137.5 -220.2 -327.6 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, estimates from the logit regression are represented, and the 
dependent variable is repayment. Region fixed effects are included in all specifications. The borrowers with no 
credit rating are eliminated except the specification (2). 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
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borrowers if the loan amount is smaller than the cut-off amount when their 
initial desired loan amount was larger.15 In specification (1), we exclude these 
observations from the sample. Even after removing these observations, the 
coefficient of the consulting variable remains insignificant.  
We also conducted additional robustness tests. In specification (2), we include 
the borrowers with no credit rating in the sample. In specification (3), we shorten 
the loan origination period. In specification (4), we change the range of the loan 
amount of the samples to between 6 and 13 million won. In specification (5), we 
use the repayment information observed six month later, in June of 2013. The 
results in these cases are similar to those of the main regression, and the coefficient 




This research attempts to determine the effects of pre-lending business 
consulting on the probability of repayment by analyzing confidential data from the 
Smile Microcredit Bank in Korea. The SMB has randomly changed the criteria 
which determine which clients are required to enroll in a three-day one-on-one 
consulting program. This study utilized this as an identification strategy. 
The pre-lending consulting service made a significant difference among clients 
who were already running a business. Clients who participated in the consulting 
program had a far lower rate of having their payments go into arrears than those 
who did not. Given the significant difference in repayment behavior, more clients 
in receipt of operating loans should undergo this type of consulting program 
instead of limiting eligibility to clients who borrow 10 million won or more. In 
addition, financially disadvantaged business owners using other microcredit 
products should also be encouraged to take the SEMAS consulting program. 
In contrast, in the sample of clients who received start-up business loans, no 
significant differences in behaviors are observed between clients who experienced 
the pre-lending consulting program and those who did not. Thus, other types of 
support in addition to the consulting program may be necessary for those starting 
businesses, as they must carry out extensive preparatory work prior to opening the 
business. For example, clients should be required to complete an educational 
program so that they may better understand the details discussed in the consulting 
sessions. Moreover, post-lending consulting should be provided on a regular basis 
to give clients timely advice and help them tackle unexpected problems that may 
arise during the course of running their business.  
This research is meaningful in that empirical study of microcredit is scarce in 
countries other than developing countries. However, more research needs to be 
done in the future in an effort to determine the direct effect of consulting programs 
on business performance from a long-term perspective. Furthermore, a randomized 
control treatment should be conducted so as to increase the validity of the findings 
in this research.   
?
15The borrowers who take out loans which are between 9.6 million and 10 million won are excluded when the 
originally desired amount was more than 10 million won on the loan application document.  
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This research looks only at pre-lending consulting outsourced to an external 
agency, but it would be interesting and necessary to determine how mentoring or 
consulting directly provided by loan officers and how a group-training program 
rather than a one-on-one program can change clients’ behavior and reduce 
situations of arrears. Such efforts are left for future work. 
?
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